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ABSTRACT
BitTorrent is the most popular P2P content delivery appli-
cation where individual users share various type of content
with tens of thousands of other users. The growing popular-
ity of BitTorrent is primarily due to the availability of valu-
able content without any cost for the consumers. However,
apart from required resources, publishing (sharing) valuable
(and often copyrighted) content has serious legal implica-
tions for user who publish the material (or publishers). This
raises a question that whether (at least major) content pub-
lishers behave in an altruistic fashion or have other incen-
tives such as financial. In this study, we identify the content
publishers of more than 55k torrents in 2 major BitTorrent
portals and examine their behavior. We demonstrate that a
small fraction of publishers are responsible for 66% of pub-
lished content and 75% of the downloads. Our investigations
reveal that these major publishers respond to two different
profiles. On one hand, antipiracy agencies and malicious
publishers publish a large amount of fake files to protect
copyrighted content and spread malware respectively. On
the other hand, content publishing in BitTorrent is largely
driven by companies with financial incentive. Therefore, if
these companies lose their interest or are unable to publish
content, BitTorrent traffic/portals may disappear or at least
their associated traffic will significantly reduce.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Peer to Peer (P2P) file-sharing applications, and more
specifically BitTorrent, are a clear example of killer ap-
plications in the last decade. For instance, BitTorrent
is currently used by hundreds of millions of users and
is responsible for a large portion of the Internet traf-
fic share [4]. This has attracted the attention of the
research community that has mainly focused on under-
standing the technical aspects of BitTorrent functional-
ity [9, 15, 12] and improving its performance [18, 14].
Moreover, some few papers have analyzed the demo-
graphics of BitTorrent [21, 11, 19] and also the secu-
rity [20] and privacy issues [6, 7]. However, the socio-
economic aspects associated to BitTorrent in particular,
and to other P2P file sharing systems in general, have
received little attention despite of the importance that
they have to the complete understanding of such kind of
applications. This paper is a first step in this direction.
The availability of free popular (often copyrighted)
content that is of interest to millions of people (e.g. re-
cent TV Shows episodes, Hollywood movies, etc) is the
key pillar that makes BitTorrent an extremely success-
ful system. In this paper we study content publishing
in BitTorrent from a technical and more importantly
socio-economic point of view. In short, we try to un-
ravel who publishes content in BitTorrent, and why.
For this purpose we rely on real data from a large
scale measurement study performed over two large Bit-
Torrent Portals (Mininova and The Pirate Bay). Our
dataset (>300 GB) consits of information on more than
35M IP addresses and more than 55K published con-
tents including the content publisher.
Using this dataset, we have first looked at the contri-
bution of the different content publishers and conclude
that just few publishers (around 100) are responsible
of uploading 2/3 of the contents that serve 3/4 of the
downloads in our major dataset. Furthermore, an im-
portant part of these major publishers consume few or
even no contents, rather they dedicate their resources
(almost) to only seed the published content. This is un-
usual behavior since standard BitTorrent users typically
employ their resources for both seeding and download-
ing contents. Therefore, our observation reveals that
major BitTorrent publishers present an anomalous be-
havior. This argument is reinforced after checking that
many of the files published by these major publish-
ers are copyrighted. Then, major publishers not only
expend their resources without any apparent benefit,
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but they also face legal reactions due to the publica-
tion of copyrighted content [1, 2]. These findings raise
the following questions: are these major publishers good
citizenships that allocate a great deal of resources and
assume legal risk for the good of the community? or
contrary, do they have any (still) unknown incentive to
behave in this manner?
To answer these questions we perform a systematic
study of the aforementioned major publishers. We first
discover the identity of these major publishers by look-
ing at their associated usernames and IPs. This allows
us to classify them into two different groups: fake pub-
lishers publish a large number of fake content and top
publishers publish a large number of proper (often copy-
righted) content.
Afterwards we study main characteristics of these
groups such as the popularity of the content they pub-
lish and their seeding behavior (i.e. its signature). One
one hand, our results reveal that the falseness of the
content published by fake publishers makes their swarms
unpopular and obeys them to seed multiple torrents in
parallel across long sessions. On the other hand, top
publishers are responsible of very popular contents for
which they guarantee a proper seeding.
Finally we exploit the available information related
to these publishers (e.g. in the BitTorrent portals) and
conclude that fake publishers are linked to antipiracy
agencies and malicious users, whereas half of top pub-
lishers run their own web sites that report them eco-
nomical benefits that are very substantial in some few
cases.
In summary the main contributions of this paper are:
• A simple measurement methodology to monitor
the content publishing activity in major BitTor-
rent portals. This methodology has been used to
implement a system that continuously monitors
the content publishing activity in The Pirate Bay
portal. The data gathered is made publicly avail-
able through a web interface.
• The major portion of content publishing activity
in BitTorrent is concentrated in a relative small
set of publishers (around 100) that are responsi-
ble of 2/3 of the published content and 3/4 of the
downloads. This set of publishers can be further
divided into three subsets that we name fake pub-
lishers, altruistic top publishers and profit-driven
top publishers.
• fake publishers are set up by either anti-piracy
agencies or malicious users and are responsible of
30% of the content and 25% of downloads. This
means that these publishers sustain a continuous
poisoning-like index attack [16] against BitTorrent
portals that based on our results affects to millions
of downloaders.
• profit-driven top publishers own fairly profitable
web sites. They use major BitTorrent portals such
as The Pirate Bay as a platform to advertise their
web site to millions of users. For this purpose they
publish popular torrents where they attach the
URL of their web site in various manners. The
publishers linked to this business model are re-
sponsible of around 30% of content and 40% of
downloads.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section
2 describes our measurement methodology. Sections 3
and 4 are dedicated to the identification of major pub-
lishers and their main characteristics (i.e. signature) re-
spectively. In Section 5 we study the incentives that
major publishers have to perform this activity. Section
6 presents other players that also benefit from content
publishing. In Section 7 we describe our publicly avail-
able application to monitor content publishing activity
in The Pirate Bay portal. Finally Section 8 discusses
related work and Section 9 concludes the paper.
.
2. MEASUREMENT METHODOLOGY
This section describes our methodology to identify
the initial publisher of a file that is distributed through
a BitTorrent swarm. Towards this end, we first briefly
describe the required background on how a user joins a
BitTorrent swarm.
Background: A BitTorrent client takes the following
steps to join the swarm associated with fileX . First, the
client obtains the .torrent file associated to the desired
swarm. The .torrent file contains contact information
for the tracker that manages the swarm and the number
of pieces of file X , etc. Second, the client connects to
the tracker and obtains the following information: (i)
the number of seeders and leechers that are currently
connected to the swarm, and (ii) N (typically 50) ran-
dom IP addresses of participating peers in the swarm.
Furthermore, if the number of neighbors is eventually
lower than a given threshold (typically 20), the client
contacts the tracker again to learn about other peers in
the swarm.
To facilitate the bootstrapping process, the .torrent
files are typically indexed at BitTorrent portals. Some
of the major portals (e.g. The Pirate Bay or Mininova)
index millions of .torrent files [21], classify them into
different categories and provide a web page with de-
tailed information (content category, publisher’s user-
name, file size, and file description). These portals also
offer an RSS feed to announce a newly published file.
The RSS gives also some extra information such as con-
tent category, content size and username that published
the .torrent file.
Identifying Initial Publisher: In BitTorrent a con-
tent publisher is identified by its username [21] and IP
address. The objective of our measurement study is to
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Portal Start End #Torrents #IP
addresses
mn08 Mininova 09-Dec-08 16-Jan-09 - /20.8K 8.2M
pb09 Pirate Bay 28-Nov-09 18-Dec-09 23.2K/10.4K 52.9K
pb10 Pirate Bay 06-Apr-10 05-May-10 38.4K/14.6K 27.3M
Table 1: Datasets Description
determine the identity of the initial publisher of a large
number of torrents and to assess the popularity of each
published file (i.e. the number and identity of peers who
download the published file).
Toward this end, we leverage the RSS feed to de-
tect the availability of a new file on major BitTorrent
portals and retrieve the publisher’s username. In order
to obtain the publisher’s IP address, we immediately
download the .torrent file and connect to the associated
tracker1. This implies that we often contact the tracker
shortly after the birth of the associated swarm when
the number of participating peers is likely to be small
and the initial publisher (i.e. seeder) is one of them.
We retrieve the IP address of all participating peers as
well as the current number of seeders in the swarm. If
there is only one seeder in the swarm and the num-
ber of participating peers is not too large (i.e. < 20),
we obtain the bitfield of available pieces at individual
peers to identify the seeder. Otherwise, reliably iden-
tifying the initial seeder is difficult because there are
more than one seeder or the number of participating
peers is large. We cannot directly contact the initial
seeder that is behind a NAT box and thus unable to
identify the initial publisher’s IP address in such cases.
Therefore, we are able to infer the publisher’s username
for all the crawled files. Furthermore, since we quickly
detect the birth of a torrent through the RSS feed, we
often (for 40% of the files) contact the swarm when the
number of participating peers are small and there is a
single seeder that is not behind a NAT2, thus being able
to infer the publisher’s IP address.
Therefore, after the first connection to the tracker, we
can identify the identity of the initial publisher (user-
name and/or IP address) in most cases and determine
basic properties of the published content. At this point,
we periodically query the tracker in order to obtain the
IP addresses of the participants in the content swarm
and always solicit the maximum number of IP addresses
(i.e. 200) from the tracker. To avoid being blacklisted
by the tracker, we issue our query at the maximum
1Note that for most of the torrents we have used the Open
BitTorrent tracker, that is the current major BitTorrent
tracker.
2Our investigations revealed two interesting scenarios for
which we could not identify the initial publisher’s IP ad-
dress: (i) swarms that have a large number of peers shortly
after they are added to the portal. We discovered that these
swarms have already been published in other portals. (ii)
swarms for which the tracker did not report any seeder for
a while or did not report a seeder at all.
rate that is allowed by the tracker (i.e. 1 query ev-
ery 10 to 15 minutes depending on the tracker load).
Given this constraint, we query the tracker from several
geographically-distributed machines so that the aggre-
gated information by all these machines provides an ad-
equately high resolution view of participating peers and
their evolution over time. We continue to monitor a tar-
get swarm until we receive 10 consecutive empty replies
from the tracker. We use MaxMind Database [3] to
map all the IP addresses (for both publishers and down-
loaders) to their corresponding ISPs and geographical
location.
2.1 Dataset
We used the previously described methodology to
identify a large number of BitTorrent swarms at two
major BitTorrent portals, namely Mininova and The Pi-
rate Bay. Each one of these portals was the most popu-
lar BitTorrent portal at the time of of our measurement
according to Alexa ranking. Table 1 shows the main fea-
tures of our three datasets (1 from Mininova and 2 from
the The Pirate Bay) including the start and end dates of
our measurement, the number of torrents for which we
identified the initial publisher (username/IP address),
and the total number of discovered IP addresses asso-
ciated for all the monitored swarms. We refer to these
datasets as mn08, pb09 and pb10 throughout this pa-
per. We note that dataset mn08 does not contain the
username of initial publishers, whereas pb09 queries the
tracker just once after we identify the file through the
RSS.
3. IDENTIFYING MAJOR PUBLISHER
As stated before a publisher can be identified by its
username and/or IP address. In our analysis, we iden-
tify individual publishers by their username since the
username is expected to remain consistent across dif-
ferent torrents, although we will make some exceptions
(See fake publishers below in this Section). Further-
more, in case of mn08 we use the IP address since we
lack of username information.
3.1 Skewness of Contribution
First, we examine the level of contribution (i.e. the
number of published files) across identified content pub-
lishers in each dataset. Figure 1 depicts the percentage
of files that are published by the top x% of publishers.
We observe that the top 3% of BitTorrent publishers
contribute roughly 40% of published content. Further-
more, if we carefully look at the IP addresses of the top-
100 (i.e. 3%) publishers in our pb10 dataset, we realize
that an important part of them either do not download
any content (40%) or download less than 5 files (80%).
This large contribution of resources (bandwidth, stor-
age, or content) among top BitTorrent publishers does
3
mn08 pb09 pb10
ISP type % ISP Type % ISP Type %
OVH Hosting Provider 13.31 OVH Hosting Provider 24.76 OVH Hosting Provider 15.16
Comcast Commercial ISP 4.69 Comcast Commercial ISP 3.67 SoftLayer Tech. Hosting Provider 4.52
Keyweb Hosting Provider 3.18 Road Runner Commercial ISP 2.3 FDCservers Hosting Provider 3.64
Road Runner Commercial ISP 3.03 Romania DS Commercial ISP 2.27 Open Computer Network Commercial ISP 3.59
NetDirect Hosting Provider 2.44 MTT Network Commercial ISP 1.95 tzulo Hosting Provider 3.36
Virgin Media Commercial ISP 2.42 Verizon Commercial ISP 1.64 Comcast Commercial ISP 2.86
NetWork Operations Center Hosting Provider 2.39 Virgin Media Commercial ISP 1.49 Cosema Commercial ISP 2.25
SBC Commercial ISP 2.38 SBC Commercial ISP 1.41 Telefonica Commercial ISP 2.22
Comcor-TV Commercial ISP 2.33 NIB Commercial ISP 1.26 Jazz Telecom. Commercial ISP 2.07
Telecom Italia Commercial ISP 2.02 tzulo Hosting Provider 1.14 4RWEB Hosting Provider 2.06
Table 2: Content Publishers Distribution per ISP
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Figure 1: Percentage of content published by the
top x% publishers
not seem to be justified by peers’ altruism for two sim-
ple reasons:
- Required Resources/Cost : publishing a large num-
ber of content requires a significant amount of process-
ing and bandwidth. For example, some of these major
content publishers (e.g. www.eztv.it) recommend to
allocate at least 10Mbps in order to sustain the seeding
of few (around 5) files in parallel.
- Legal Implications: As other studies have reported
[6] and we confirm in our datasets, a large fraction of
content published by major publishers is copyrighted
material (recent movies or TV series). Thus, publishing
these files is likely to have serious legal consequences for
these publishers [1, 2].
This raises the question that why these small frac-
tion of entities allocate a great deal of (costly) resources
to contribute many files into BitTorrent sessions despite
potential legal implications? Is this level of contribution
simply derived by an altruistic behavior of good citizens
or there are other incentives?. We answer these ques-
tions in Section 5.
3.2 Publishers’ ISPs
To help identify content publishers in our dataset,
we determine the ISP that host each major publisher
and use that information to assess the type of service
(and available resources) that a publisher is likely to
have. Toward this end, we map the IP address for a
publisher in each dataset to its corresponding ISP using
the MaxMind database [3]. We then examine publicly
available information about each ISP (e.g. its web page)
to determine whether it is a commercial ISP or a hosting
provider. We performed these analysis only for the top-
100 (roughly 3%) of publishers since they are mostly of
interest and the collection of the required information
is a tedious task.
We observe that 42% of top-100 publishers in pb10
(35% of top-100 in pb09 ) are located in ten hosting ser-
vices. Furthermore, more than half of these publishers
are concentrated at a particular hosting service (OVH),
namely 22% of top-100 in pb10 and 20% of top-100 in
pb09. Since we do not have publishers’ username for
mn08, we examine top-100 publishers based on their IP
addresses (i.e. can not assess aggregated contribution
of a user with different IP addresses). 77% of top-100
publishers in mn08 are also located in hosting services
and 45% of them are specifically at OVH.
In short, our analysis reveals that a significant frac-
tion of major publishers are located at a few hosting
services and a large percentage of them at OVH.
We also examine the contribution of BitTorrent pub-
lishers at the ISP-level by mapping all the publishers to
their ISPs and identify the top-10 ISPs based on their
aggregate published content for each dataset as shown
in Table 2. This table reveals that content publishers
who are located at a particular hosting provider, namely
OVH, have consistently contributed a significant frac-
tion of published content at major BitTorrent portals.
There are also several commercial ISPs (e.g. Comcast)
in Table 2 with a much smaller contribution.
To assess the difference between users from hosting
providers and commercial ISPs, we compare and con-
trast all publishers that are located at OVH and Com-
cast as a representative ISP for each class of publish-
ers in Table 3. This table demonstrates the following
two important differences: First, the aggregate contri-
bution of each publisher at OVH is on average a few
times larger than Comcast publishers. Second, Com-
cast publishers are sparsely scattered across many /16
IP prefixes and many geographical locations in the US
whereas OVH publishers are concentrated in a few /16
IP prefixes and a handful of different locations in Eu-
rope (the location of OVH’s data centers). In essence,
the published content by Comcast comes from a large
4
Fed IP addr /16 IP Geo
torrents Pref. Loc.
OVH (mn08) 2766 164 5 2
Comcast (mn08) 976 675 269 400
OVH (pb09) 2577 78 5 2
Comcast (pb09) 382 198 143 129
OVH (pb10) 2213 92 7 4
Comcast (pb10) 408 185 139 147
Table 3: Characteristics of OVH feeders and
Comcast feeders in mn08 and pb09 datasets.
number of typical altruistic users where each one pub-
lishes a small number of items from their home or work.
In contrast, OVH publishers appear to be paying for a
well provisioned service to be able to publish a much
larger number of files. We have also examined con-
sumer peers in captured torrents and did not observe
the presence of OVH users among the consuming peers.
In summary, the examination of ISPs that host major
BitTorrent publishers suggests that these publishers are
located either at a few hosting providers (with a large
concentration at OVH) or at commercial ISPs. These
publishers contribute a significantly larger number of
files than average publishers. Furthermore, publishers
who are located at hosting providers do not consume
published content by other publishers.
3.3 Fine Grained Look at Major Publishers
Now, we examine the mapping between username and
IP address of top-100 content publishers in the pb10
dataset in order to gain some insight about major pub-
lisher behavior, and we discover the following interest-
ing points:
First, if we focus on the top-100 IP addresses who
have published the largest number of files, only 55% of
them are used by a unique username. The remaining
45% of IP addresses of major publishers are mapped
to a large number of usernames. We have carefully in-
vestigated this set of IP addresses and discovered that
they use either hacked or manually created (i.e. ran-
dom name) username accounts to inject fake content.
These publishers appear to be associated with anti-
piracy agencies or malicious users. The former group
tries to avoid the distribution of copyrighted content
whereas the latter attempts to disseminate malware.
We refer to these publishers as fake publishers. Sur-
prisingly, fake publishers are responsible of 1030 user-
names (around 25%), 30% of the content and 25% of the
downloads in our pb10 dataset. Then, major BitTor-
rent portals are suffering from a systematic poisoning
index attack [16] that affects to more than 1/4 of the
published content. The portals fight this phenomenon
by removing the fake contents as well as the user ac-
counts used to publish them3. However, this technique
3we exploit this fact to identify if a username has been used
by a fake publisher.
does not seem to be enough effective since millions of
users initiate the download of fake content. Finally, it
is worth noting that most of the fake publishers per-
form their activity from three specific hosting providers
named tzulo, FDC Servers and 4RWEB. Due to the rel-
evant activity of these publishers we study them as an
independent group in the rest of the paper.
Second, the inspection of the top-100 usernames who
publish the largest number of files shows that only 25%
of them operate from a single IP. The remaining 75% of
top usernames utilize multiple IPs and can be classified
into the following common cases: (i) 34% of usernames
with multiple IP addresses use a reduced number of IPs
(5.7 in average) from hosting providers in order to pro-
vide the required resources for seeding a large number of
files.(ii) 24% of usernames with multiple IP addresses
(13.8 in average) located in a single commercial ISP.
Their mapping to multiple IP addresses must be due
to the periodical change of their assigned IP address
by their ISP. (iii) The other 16% of these usernames
are mapped to multiple IP addresses (7.7 in average)
at different commercial ISPs. These are users who in-
ject content from various locations (e.g. home and work
computer). To minimize the impact of abnormal pub-
lishers, we removed the 16 usernames from the top-100
usernames that appeared to be compromised and used
for publishing fake content (and will be analyzed sepa-
rately). We refer to the resulting group as Top. Note
that the Top publishers are responsible of 37% of the
content and 50% of the total downloads in our pb10
dataset.
In summary, the major portion of the content comes
from two reduced group of publishers: Top publishers
and Fake publishers that collectively are responsible of
2/3 of the published content and 3/4 of the downloads.
In the rest of the paper we devote or effort to charac-
terize these two groups.
4. SIGNATURE OF MAJOR PUBLISHER
Before we investigate the incentives of major BitTor-
rent publishers, we examine whether they exhibit any
other distinguishing features, i.e. whether major pub-
lishers have a distinguishing signature. Any such dis-
tinguishing features could shed some light on the under-
lying incentives of these publishers. Toward this end,
in the next few subsections, we examine the following
characteristics of major publishers in our datasets: (i)
the type of published content, (ii) the popularity of pub-
lished content, and (iii) the availability and seeding be-
havior of a publisher.
To identify distinguishing features, we examine the
above characteristics across the following three target
groups in each dataset: all publishers (labeled as “All”),
all fake publishers (labeled as “Fake”) and all top-100
(non-fake) publishers regardless of their ISPs (labeled
5
(a) mn08 (b) pb10
Figure 2: Type of Content Published distribu-
tion for the different set of publishers: all, fake,
top, top-hp and top-ci
as “Top”). We also examine the break down of top
publishers based on their ISPs into hosting providers
and commercial ISPs, labeled as “Top-HP” and “Top-
CI”, respectively4.
4.1 Content Type
We leverage the reported content type by each pub-
lisher to classify the published content across different
groups. Figure 2 depicts the break down of published
contents across different type for all publishers in each
target group for our Mininova and our major Pirate Bay
datasets. This figure reveals a few interesting trends as
follows:
First, Video (composed mainly by Movies, TV-Shows
and Porn content) constitutes a significant fraction of
published files across most groups with some important
differences. The percentage of published video across
all publishers is around 37%-51% but it is slightly larger
among top publishers. However, video is clearly a larger
fraction of published content by the top publishers lo-
cated in hosting providers in our pb10 dataset. Fake
publishers primarily focus on Videos (recent movies and
shows) and Software content. This supports our earlier
observation that these publishers consist of antipiracy
agencies and malicious users where the former group
publishes a fake version of e.g. last movies and the lat-
ter provides software that contains malware.
4.2 Content Popularity
The number of published files by a publisher shows
only one dimension of its contribution to BitTorrent.
The other equally important issue is the popularity of
each published content (i.e. the number of download-
ers regardless of their download progress) by individual
publishers. Figure 3 shows the box plot of the distribu-
tion of average downloaders per torrent per publisher
4All the top-** results for dataset mn08 are determined
based on IP address since we do not have username informa-
tion for publishers in this dataset as we stated earlier. Also
without username information for each publisher in mn08
dataset, we can not identify fake publishers.
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Figure 3: Avg Num of Downloaders per torrent
per publisher for all, fake, top, top-hp, top-ci
across all publishers in each target group where each
box presents 25th, 50th and 75th percentiles.
On the one hand, the median popularity of top pub-
lishers’ torrents is 7 times higher than standard users
(represented by All). If we look more closely to the top
publishers, those located in hosting providers publish
torrents in median 1.5 times more popular than those
located in commercial ISPs. Then, those top publish-
ers with more resources publish typically more popular
contents. On the other hand, fake publishers’ torrents
are the most unpopular among the studied groups. This
is because the portals actively monitor the torrents and
immediately remove the content identified as fake, thus
avoiding new users downloading it. Furthermore, users
quickly realize the fake nature of these torrents and re-
port this info on blogs that also prevent other users from
downloading them.
In summary, top publishers are responsible of a larger
number of popular torrents. This has a multiplica-
tive effect making top publishers that inject 37.5% of
the content being responsible of a higher percentage of
downloaders (around 50%). The low popularity of fake
publishers’ torrents produces a contrary effect: they are
responsible of 30% of the content but only 25% of the
downloads.
4.3 Seeding Behavior
We characterize the seeding behavior of individual
BitTorrent publishers in our target groups using the fol-
lowing metrics: (i) Average seeding time of a publisher
for its published content, (ii) Average number of paral-
lel seeded torrents and (iii) aggregated session time of a
publisher across all its torrents. Since calculating these
properties requires detailed analysis of our dataset that
are computationally intensive, we are unable to derive
these values for all publishers, instead we have used a
random set of 400 publishers to represent the standard
behaviour of the publishers5.
5For consistency and readability purposes we use the label
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(a) Average Seeding Time per Content
per Publisher
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(b) Average Number of Parallel Seed
Torrents Per Publisher
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(c) Average Global Session Time Per
Publisher
Figure 4: Seeding Behaviour for all, fake, top, top-hp and top-ci
In order to compute these metrics we need to estimate
the time that a specific publisher has been connected to
a torrent (in one or multiple sessions). Since each query
to the tracker just reports (at most) a random subset
of 200 IPs, in big torrents (>200 peers), we need to
perform multiple queries in order to assess the presence
of the publisher in the torrent. In Appendix A we detail
the technique used to compute the session time of a
specific user in a specific torrent.
Average Seeding Time: We measure the duration of
time that a publisher stays in a torrent since its birth to
seed the content. In general, a publisher can leave the
torrent once there is an adequate fraction of other seeds.
Figure 4(a) depicts the summary distribution of average
seeding time across all publishers in each target group.
This figure demonstrates the following points: First, the
seeding time for fake publishers is significantly longer
than publishers in other groups. Since these publishers
do not provide the actual content, the initial fake pub-
lisher remains the only seed in the session (i.e. other
users do not help in seeding fake content) to keep the
torrent alive. Second, focusing on top publishers the
Figure shows that they typically seed a content for a
few hours. However, the seeding time for top publishers
from hosting providers is clearly longer than top pub-
lishers from commercial ISPs. This suggests that pub-
lishers at hosting providers are more concerned about
the availability of their published content.
Average number of Parallel Torrents: Figure 4(b)
depicts the summary distribution of the average num-
ber of torrents that a publisher seeds in parallel across
publishers in each target group. This figure indicates
that fake publishers seed many torrents in parallel. We
have seen that fake publishers typically publish a large
number of torrents, furthermore no one helps them on
seeding task. Thus if they want to keep alive all these
torrents they have to seed all of them in parallel.
“All” to refer to this random subset of all publishers.
The result for top publisher shows that the typical
number of seeded torrents in parallel is the same (around
3 torrents) for top publishers regardless of their loca-
tion. However, we expect that a regular publisher seed
concurrently only 1 file.
Aggregated Session Time: We have also quanti-
fied the availability of individual publishers by estimat-
ing the aggregated session time that each publisher is
present in the system across all published torrent. Fig-
ure 4(c) shows the distribution of this availability mea-
sure across publishers in each target group. As expected
fake publishers present the longest aggregated session
time due to their obligation to continuously seed their
contents to keep them alive. If we focus on top publish-
ers, they exhibit a typical aggregated session 10 times
longer than standard users. Furthermore, top publish-
ers at hosting services are clearly more available than
those from commercial ISPs.
4.4 Summary
BitTorrent content publishers can be divided into nor-
mal/altruistic users that are average users playing the
role of publisher and consumer in BitTorrent. Whereas
fake and top publishers publish a significant amount
of files. One one hand, fake publishers publish a large
number of unpopular Video and Software contents from
a reduced number of hosting providers. Due to the false-
ness of their files, they need to seed multiple files across
long sessions to keep these alive. We have stated that
this behaviour responds to the interest of antipiracy
agencies and malicious users that set up the fake pub-
lishers. We validate it in the next section.
On the other hand, top publishers often focus on
video and they are located in either hosting facilities
or commercial ISPs. Furthermore their content is pop-
ular, they stay long session in the system and ensure
proper seeding of the content. All these evidences sug-
gest that these top publishers are interested in visibility
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of the posted content (in attracting a large number of
users). The behavior and incurred cost by these partici-
pants cannot be considered as altruistic especially since
they typically do not consume but just inject content
into the system. Therefore, the most likely conceivable
motivation for the behaviour of these top publishers is
financial incentive. We examine this hypothesis in the
rest of the paper.
5. INCENTIVES OF MAJOR PUBLISHERS
We have first analyzed fake publishers. We first look
at the name of the published files that are typically
catchy titles (e.g. recent released Hollywood movies).
Furthermore, we have downloaded a few of their files.
We note that in most of the cases the file had been al-
ready removed6. The few downloaded files were indeed
fake contents. Some of them were modified with the in-
clusion of anti-piracy advertisement/messages whereas
some others led to malware software7. These observa-
tions validate our assessment that behind fake publish-
ers are anti-piracy agents and malicious users. On one
hand, the anti-piracy agents publish fake files with the
name of the copyrighted contents they want to protect.
On the other hand, the malicious users publish content
with catchy titles since these have the ability of attract-
ing a larger population of potential victims. Therefore,
we have clearly characterized the incentives of fake pub-
lishers. In the rest of this section we characterize the
major (non-fake) publishers.
Our goal is to identify the incentives of major (non-
fake) BitTorrent publishers to commit a significant amount
of resources and deal with likely legal implications of
publishing copyrighted content. We believe that the
behavior of these publishers may not be altruistic and
may be driven by a financial interest. More specifically,
our hypothesis is that these publishers leverage major
BitTorrent portals as a venue to freely attract down-
loading users to their web sites. To verify this hypothe-
sis, we conduct an investigation to gather the following
information about each one of the top (i.e. top-100 non-
faked) publishers:
- Promoting URL: the URL that downloaders of a pub-
lished content may encounter,
- Publisher’s Username: any publicly available informa-
tion about the username that a major publisher uses in
The Pirate Bay portal, and
- Business Profile: offered services (and choices) at the
6We tried to download the file after the measurement study
was performed and we had made a first analysis of the data.
This typically occurred a few weeks since the publication of
the content. Therefore, in most of the cases the content was
anymore no longer.
7The content was a video that pointed to an specific
software to be played. This software was a malware
(e.g. http://flvdirect.com/.
promoting URL.
Promoting URL:We emulate the experience of a user
for downloading a few randomly-selected files published
by each top publisher to determine whether and where
they may encounter a promoting URL. We identified
three places where publishers may embed a promoting
URL: (i) name of the downloaded file (e.g. user mois20
name all his files as filename-divxatope.com, thus adver-
tising the url www.divxatope.com), (ii) the textbox in
the web page associated with each published content,
(iii) name of a text file that is distributed with the ac-
tual content and is displayed by the BitTorrent software
when opening the .torrent file.
Our investigation indicates that the second approach
(using the textbox) is the most common technique among
the publishers.
Publisher’s Username: We browsed the Internet to
learn more information about the username associated
with each top publisher. First, the username is in some
cases directly related to the URL (e.g.user UltraTor-
rents whose url is www.ultratorrents.com). This ex-
ercise also reveals whether this username publishes on
other major BitTorrent portals in addition to The Pi-
rate Bay. Finally, posted information in various forums
could reveal (among other things) the promoting web
site.
Business Services: We characterize the type of ser-
vices offered at the promoting URL and ways that the
web site may generate income (e.g. posting ads). We
also capture the exchanged http headers between a web
browser and the promoting URL to identify established
connections to third-party web sites (e.g. redirection to
ads web sites or some third party aggregator) using the
technique described in [13].
5.1 Classifying Publishers
Using the methodology described, we examined a few
published torrents for each one of the top publishers
as well as sample torrents for 100 randomly selected
publishers that are not in the top-100, called regular
publishers. On the one hand, we did not discover any
interesting or unusual behavior in torrents published by
regular publishers and thus conclude that they behave
in an altruistic manner. On the other hand, a large
fraction of seeded torrents by the top publishers sys-
tematically promote one or more web sites for financial
incentives. Our examination revealed that these pub-
lishers often include a promotional URL in the textbox
of the content web page and some of them use other of
the described techniques as well. We classify these top
publishers based on their business profile (i.e. type of
business they run based on the content of the promot-
ing web sites) and describe how they leverage BitTor-
rent portals to intercept and redirect users to their web
sites.
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Private BitTorrent Portals/Trackers: A subset of
major publishers, 26% of top, own their BitTorrent
portals that are in some cases associated with private
trackers [10]. These private trackers guarantee a better
user experience in terms of download rate (compared to
major open BitTorrent Portals) but require clients to
maintain certain seeding ratio. More specifically, each
participating BitTorrent client is required to seed con-
tent proportional to the amount of data they download
across multiple torrents. To achieve this goal, users
are required to register in the website and login before
downloading the torrent files.
The publishers in this class publish 18% of all the
content and more impressively they are responsible of
29% of the downloads. This means that around 20 pub-
lishers are responsible of almost 1/3 of the downloads.
2/3 of these publishers advertise the URL in the textbox
at the content web page, whereas 1/4 use some of the
other described techniques (note that some of them use
multiple techniques to advertise their URL).
Furthermore, they appear to obtain financial profit
in three different ways: (i) Posting advertisement in
their website, (ii) Seeking donations from visitors to
continue their basic service, and (iii) Collecting a fee
for VIP access that allows the client to download any
content without sustaining any kind of seeding ratio.
These publishers typically inject video, audio and ap-
plication content into BitTorrent portals. Interestingly,
a significant fraction of publishers in this class (40%)
publish content in a specific language (Italian, Dutch,
Spanish or Swedish) and specifically a 66% of this group
are dedicated to Spanish content. This finding is con-
sistent with prior studies that reported a high level of
copyright infringement in Spain [5].
Other Web Sites: Another class of top publishers
(24%) promote URLs that are associated with web sites
that are hosting images (e.g. www.pixsor.com), forums
or even religious groups (e.g. lightmiddleway.com).
These publishers inject 8% of the content in the system
and are responsible of 11% of the downloads. All the
publishers in this class advertise their URL using the
textbox in the content web page and only few of them
use (in addition) some of the other techniques. Further-
more, most of them (70%) publish only porn content.
Specifically, all those running a hosting images portal
publish exclusively porn content. By closely inspect-
ing these sites we realize that they store adult/sexual
pictures, hence by publishing porn content in major Bit-
Torrent portals they are targeting millions of users that
may be interested in their web sites. The income of the
portals within this class is based on advertisement.
Altruistic Publishers: The remaining top publish-
ers (52%) appear to be altruistic users since they do
not seem to directly promote any URL. They are re-
sponsible of 11.5% of the content and also 11.5% of the
downloads. Many of these users publish music and e-
book files that are light files that require lower seeding
resources. Furthermore, they typically include a very
extensive description of the content and often ask other
users to help with seeding the content. Evidence sug-
gests therefore that these publishers may have limited
resources and thus they need the help of others to sus-
tain the distribution of their content.
In summary, half of the top publishers advertise a
web portal in their published torrents. Thus it seems
that their intention, by massively content publication
via major BitTorrent portals, is to attract a large num-
ber of users to their web sites. The income of these
portals come from ads and in the specific case of pri-
vate BitTorrent portals also from donations and VIP
accesses. Overall, these profit-driven publishers publish
26% of the content and receives 40% of the downloads.
Therefore, the removal of these few publishers would
have a dramatic impact on the demographics of the cur-
rent BitTorrent open ecosystem. In addition, there are
a few altruistic publishers that sustain a relevant (but
not dominant) portion of content as well as the down-
loads (11.5%). This suggests that there are some good
citizens that dedicate their resources to share content
with a large number of peers in spite of the legal impli-
cations this activity may have.
5.2 Longitudinal View of Major Publishers
So far we focused on the contributions of major pub-
lishers only during our measurement intervals. Having
identified the top publishers in our pb10 dataset, we
examine the longitudinal view of the contribution by
major publishers since they appear on The Pirate Bay
portal. Toward this end, for each top publisher, we ob-
tain the username page on The Pirate Bay portal that
maintains the information about all the published con-
tent and its published time by the corresponding user
till our measurement date (June 4, 2010)8. Using this
information for all top publishers, we capture their pub-
lishing pattern over time with the following parameters:
(i) Publisher Lifetime which represents the number of
days between the first and the last appearance of the
publisher in The Pirate Bay portal, (ii) Average Pub-
lishing Rate that indicates the average number of pub-
lished content per day during their life time.
Table 4 shows the min/avg/max value of these met-
rics for the different class of publishers: BitTorrent Por-
tals, Other Web Sites and Altruistic publishers. The
profit-driven publishers (i.e. BitTorrent Portals and
Other Web sites classes) have been publishing content
during 15 months in average (at the time of the mea-
8Note that we cannot collect information about fake pub-
lishers since the web pages of their associated usernames are
removed by The Pirate Bay just after identifying they are
publishing fake content.
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Lifetime Avg. Publishing Rate
(days) (contents per day)
BT Portals 63/466/1816 0.57/11.43/79.91
Other Web sites 50/459/1989 0.38/4.31/18.98
Altruistic Publishers 10/376/1899 0.10/3.80/23.67
Table 4: Lifetime and Avg. Publishing Rate
for the different classes of content publishers:
BitTorrent Portals, Other Web sites and Al-
truistic Publishers. The represented values are
min/avg/max per class.
surement) and the most longed-lived ones keep feeding
content since more than 5 years ago. Furthermore, these
publishers have a high publishing rate, that is surpris-
ingly high in the case of the BT Portals class with users
publishing up to 80 contents per day. The altruistic
publishers present a shorter lifetime and a lower pub-
lishing rate that seems to be due to the less motivating
incentives and the lower resources they have.
In short, the content publishing in BitTorrent seems
to be a profitable business since quite a long time given
the lifetime of BitTorrent itself. Furthermore, the heavy
seeding activity performed by profit-driven publishers
(e.g. BitTorrent Portals class) during a long period of
time incurs a high and continuous investment in re-
sources that should be (at least) covered by the income
from ads (and other described means) of their web por-
tals. We analyze the income of the profit-driven pub-
lishers in the next subsection.
5.3 Estimating Publishers’ Income
Our evidence obtained in previous subsections sug-
gests that half of the top publishers seed content on
major BitTorrent portals in order to attract download-
ers to their own web site. We also showed that most
of these publishers seem to generate income at least by
posting ad in their web site. In essence these publishers
have clear financial incentives to attract users despite
the cost and legal implications. In order to validate this
key point, we assess their ability to generate income
by estimating three important but related properties
of their promoting web sites: (i) average value of the
web site, (ii) average daily income of the web site, and
(iii) average daily visits to the web site. We obtain this
information from several web sites that monitor and re-
port these statistics for major web sites on the Web.
To reduce any potential error in the provided statistics
by individual monitoring web sites, for each publisher’s
website we collect this information from six indepen-
dent monitoring web site and use the average value of
these statistics across these webs9.
Table 5 present the min/median/avg/max value of
the previous described metrics for each one of profit-
9www.sitelogr.com, www.cwire.com,
www.websiteoutlook.com, www.sitevaluecalculator.com ,
www.mywebsiteworth.com, www.yourwebsitevalue.com.
Web site Website Website
Value ($) Daily Income ($) Daily visits
BT
Portals 1K/33K/313K/2.8M 1/55/440/3.7K 74/21k/174k/1.4M
Other
Webs 24/22K/142K/1.8M 1/51/205/1.9K 7/22K/73.5K/772K
Table 5: Publisher’s website value ($), daily in-
come ($) and num of daily visits for the different
classes of profit-driven content publishers: Bit-
Torrent Portals and Other Web sites. The rep-
resented values are min/median/avg/max per
class.
driven publisher classes: BitTorrent Portals and Other
Web sites. Considering the median values (a more ro-
bust metric given the extreme values of the min and
max samples) we can state that BitTorrent publishers’
web sites are fairly profitable: valued in few tens thou-
sands dollars with daily incomes of few hundred dollars
and few tens thousands of visits per day. Furthermore,
few publishers (<10) are associated to very profitable
web sites valued in hundred of thousand or even mil-
lions of dollars, that receive daily incomes of thousands
of dollars and hundreds of thousands visits per day.
6. OTHER BENEFICIARIES IN BITTORRENT
MARKETPLACE?
In previous sections we analyzed the main character-
istics of major content publishers in BitTorrent, demon-
strating that content publishing is profitable business
for an important fraction of the top publishers; a busi-
ness that is responsible of 40% of the downloads. How-
ever, although content publishers are the key piece,
there are also other players who help sustain the busi-
ness and obtain financial benefits: Major BitTorrent
Portals, Hosting Providers and ads companies. Next we
briefly describe their role in BitTorrent content publish-
ing picture:
-Major Public BitTorrent Portals such as The Pi-
rate Bay are dedicated to index torrent files. They are
rendezvous points where content publishers and clients
publish and retrieve torrent files respectively. The main
advantage of these major portals is that they offer a re-
liable service (e.g. they rapidly reacts to remove fake
or infected content). All this makes that millions of
BitTorrent users utilize these portals every day. These
portals are the perfect target for profit-driven publisher
in order to publish their torrents and advertise their
web sites (potentially) to millions of users. Therefore,
these major portals are one of the key players of the Bit-
Torrent Ecosystem [21] that brings substantial financial
profit. For instance, The Pirate Bay is one of the most
popular sites in the whole Internet (ranked the 99th in
the Alexa Ranking) as well as one of the most valued
ones (around 10M$).
-Hosting Providers are companies dedicated to rent-
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ing servers. Heavy seeding activity performed by some
publishers requires significant resources (e.g. bandwidth
and storage). Thus a large fraction of major publish-
ers obtain the needed resources from rented servers in
hosting providers who receive income in return for the
offered service. Let’s focus on OVH, the ISP responsible
of a major portion of content published in BitTorrent.
Our measurement study shows that OVH contributes
between 78 and 164 different servers (i.e. IP addresses)
across the different datasets. Considering the cost of the
average server offered by OVH in its web page (around
300 euros/month) we estimate the average income ob-
tained by OVH due to BitTorrent content publishing
ranges between roughly 23.4K and 42.9K euros/month.
It is worth noting that some hosting providers have de-
fined strict policies against sharing copyrighted mate-
rial through P2P applications using their servers due to
legal issues10. However the income obtained by some
hosting providers such as OVH seems to justify the risk
of potential legal actions taken against them.
-Ads companies are responsible for advertisements in
the Internet. They have a set of custumers who wish to
be advertised in the Internet and a set of web sites where
they put their customers ads. They apply complex algo-
rithms to select where (in which web site) and when to
put each ad dynamically. They charge their custumers
for this service and part of this income is forwarded to
the web sites where the ads have been posted. There-
fore, ad companies look for popular web sites for where
to put ads for their costumers. We have demonstrated
in this paper that profit-driven BitTorrent content pub-
lisher’s web sites are popular, thus most of them post
ads from ads companies11. Hence, part of the income
of ads companies is directly linked to the BitTorrent
content publishing. Unfortunately, there is no practical
way to estimate the value of this incomes.
In a nutshell, this section describes the complete busi-
ness model behind content publishing in BitTorrent and
briefly characterizes the main players. Finally, Figure
5 graphically represents the business model of content
publishing in BitTorrent where the arrows indicate the
flow of money between the different players.
7. SOFTWARE FOR CONTENT PUBLISH-
ING MONITORING
We have implemented a system that continuously
monitors new contents published via The Pirate Bay
portal in order to retrieve information about content
publishers in real time. Our methodology is described
in Section 2. Here we focus on tracking the content pub-
lisher (and not the downloaders), thus we make only
one connection to the tracker just after we learn of a
10http://www.serverintellect.com/terms/aup.aspx.
11We have validated this by looking at the header exchange
between the browser and the publishers’ web site servers.
Figure 5: Business Model of Content Publishing
in Bittorrent
new torrent from The Pirate Bay RSS feed. Our sys-
tem retrieves the following information about each item:
filename, content category and subcategory (based on
The Pirate Bay categories), publisher’s username, and
(in those cases we can) the publisher’s IP address as
well as the ISP, City and Country associated to this
IP address. Furthermore, for profit-driven publishers
described in this paper we have created an individual
publisher’s web page that provides specific information
such as the publisher’s promoted url or business type.
The system stores all this information in a database.
Finally, we have built a simple web-based interface to
query this database. This interface is publicly avail-
able12.
Our application has a double goal. One the one hand,
we want to share this data with the research community
to permit further analysis of different aspects of the Bit-
Torrent content publishing system. On the other hand,
we believe that this application can be useful for regular
BitTorrent clients. First, a BitTorrent client can easily
identify those publishers that publish content aligned
with her interest (e.g. an e-books consumer could find
publishers responsible for publishing large numbers of e-
books). Furthermore, we are working on implementing
a feature to filter out fake publishers, allowing BitTor-
rent users of our application (in the future) to avoid
downloading fake content.
8. RELATED WORK
Significant research effort has been dedicated to un-
derstand different aspects of BitTorrent by gathering
data from live swarms [11, 19, 12, 9, 17, 21, 6, 8]. Most
of these works have been dedicated to understand dif-
ferent demographics [11, 19, 21] and technical [17, 12,
8] aspects. However, to the best of the authors knowl-
edge the study of socio-economics aspects of BitTorrent
12
http://bittorrentcontentpublishers.netcom.it.uc3m.es/.
Please, contact the authors in order to get an user and a password
to log in.
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(such us those covered in this paper) has received lit-
tle attention. The most relevant work to this paper is
the recent study performed by LeBlond et al. [6]. The
authors aim to demonstrate the weakness of BitTorrent
privacy. As part of their study the authors look at the
demographics of BitTorrent content publishing conclud-
ing that it presents a highly skewed distribution and the
important presence of hosting providers in this activity.
This validates some of our initial observations. It is also
worth mentioning the work done by Chao et al. [21].
The authors present the most extensive study to char-
acterize the BitTorrent ecosystem performed so far. A
small part of the paper is also dedicated to the anal-
ysis of content publishing demographics. The authors
assume that the content publisher is identified by the
username that publish the torrent file in the BitTorrent
portal. We have shown that this assumption may hide
some important information (e.g. fake publishers). The
study also corroborates that content publishing follows
a skewed distribution. Our work goes beyond simply
studying the demographics of content publishing. We
identify, characterize and classify the major publishers’
and (more interestingly) unreveal their incentives and
the business model behind content publishing in Bit-
Torrent.
9. CONCLUSION
In this paper we have deeply studied the content pub-
lishing activity in BitTorrent both from a technical and
a socio-economic point of view. The results reveal that
just few publishers (around 100) are responsible for 2/3
of the published content and 3/4 of the downloads in
our dataset. We have carefully examined these users
and discovered that:
• antipiracy-agencies and malicious users perform
systematic poisoning index attacks over major Bit-
Torrent Portals in order to obstruct download of
copyrighted content and to spread malware respec-
tively. Overall, this attack contributes 30% of
the content and attracts 25% (several millions) of
downloads.
• BitTorrent owes an important part of its success,
1/3 of the content and 1/2 of the downloads (if
we do not consider fake content), to a few pub-
lishers that are motivated by financial incentives.
We believe that (sooner or latter) these few pub-
lishers will be targeted by legal actions, and it is
unclear how this will impact the global BitTor-
rent ecosystem: will these major publishers stop
content publishing activity?, in this case, will Bit-
Torrent survive as the most important file-sharing
application without these publishers?.
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APPENDIX
A. ESTIMATION OF SESSION DURATION
In this appendix we explain the procedure utilized to
calculate the duration of the session time of a given peer
in a given torrent. We explain the procedure using the
mn08 dataset. Note that it would be similar for pb10.
Our mn08 crawler connects to the tracker periodi-
cally and obtains a random subset of all the IP addresses
participating in the torrent. Then, we cannot guarantee
to obtain the IP address of the target peer in a resolu-
tion of seconds or even few minutes. This imposes some
restrictions to compute the content publisher’s seeding
time in a given torrent.
Therefore, we firstly define a model to estimate the
number of queries to the tracker (m) needed to obtain
the IP address of the content publisher with a given
probability P . Let’s assume that: (i) we have a torrent
with N peers and (ii) for each query the tracker gives
us a random set of W IP addresses. Then, if the target
peer is in the torrent, the probability (P) of obtaining
its IP address in m consecutive queries to the tracker is
given by:
P = 1−
(
1−
W
N
)m
(1)
We have computed the maximum instantaneous pop-
ulation of the torrents in our mn08 and found that 90%
of torrents have tyically less than 165 concurrent peers.
Then, we assume that the torrents have always a popu-
lation N = 165. This is an upper bound that allows us
to remove the noise introduced by the churn. We make
a second conservative assumption: the tracker gives us
W = 50 random IPs in each response (although in most
of the cases we obtain 200 IP addresses). With these
numbers and the proposed model we can assure that, if
a peer (e.g. a content publisher) is in the torrent, we
will discover it in m = 13 queries to the tracker with a
probability higher than 0.99.
Next, we have calculated the time between 2 consec-
utive queries to the tracker in our dataset, and have
checked that 90% of them are less than 18 minutes
apart. Then, we again make a conservative assump-
tion and consider that the time between two consecutive
queries is 18 minutes.
Hence, multiplying the number of needed queries by
the time between two consecutive queries we conclude
that if a peer (e.g. content publisher) is in the torrent,
we are able to get its IP address in a period of 4h with
a probability equal to 0.99. Therefore, we consider that
a given content publisher is offline (i.e. its session has
finished) if its IP address is not gathered in the torrent
during 4 hours. We have repeated the experiments with
2h and 6h thresholds obtaining similar results.
13
